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Recent Cases
United States Supreme
Court Upholds Ordinance
Mandating Rents Ceiling On
Mobile Homes
In Yee v. City of Escondido, 112
S.Ct. 1522 (1992), the United
States Supreme Court held that an
ordinance mandating a ceiling on
rents mobile home park owners
can charge does not constitute a
Fifth Amendment taking by the
government and, therefore, does
not entitle the park owners to
compensation.
Background
In 1978, the State of Califoniia
enacted the Mobilehome Residen-
cy Law, which limits a mobile
home park owner's ability to termi-
nate the tenancy of a mobile home
owner. Valid reasons for termina-
tion include: the nonpayment of
rent, the mobile home owner's
violation of law or park rules, and
the park owner's desire to change
the use of his land. The law also
provides that when a mobile home
is sold, the park owner may not
disapprove of the purchaser if the
purchaser has the ability to pay
rent.
The law was enacted upon a
legislative finding that mobile
home owners needed unique pro-
tection from actual or constructive
eviction because of the high cost of
moving mobile homes, the poten-
tial for damage resulting from
moving them, the requirements
relating to the installation of mo-
bile homes, and the cost of land-
scaping or lot preparation.
In 1986, the city of Escondido,
California adopted a mobile home
rent control ordinance. This ordi-
nance set rents according to their
1986 levels and prohibited rent
increases without the approval of
the Escondido City Council.
John and Irene Yee ("the Yees")
own two mobile home parks in the
city of Escondido. A few months
after the adoption of the rent con-
trol ordinance, the Yees filed suit
in San Diego County Superior
Court. They alleged that the rent
control law had the effect of de-
priving them of all use and occu-
pancy of their property while
granting to the tenants of mobile
homes the right to physically and
permanently occupy their proper-
ty. The Yees sought $6 million in
damages, a declaration that the
ordinance was unconstitutional,
and an injunction barring the en-
forcement of the law.
The superior court dismissed
the complaint, and the Yees ap-
pealed. The California Court of
Appeals heard the Yees' case along
with eleven other similar cases that
had been dismissed. The court of
appeals affirmed the dismissals,
concluding that the Escondido or-
dinance in no way authorized a
permanent physical occupation of
the landlord's property and there-
fore did not constitute a taking
under the Fifth Amendment. Eight
of the twelve park owners, includ-
ing the Yees, petitioned the United
States Supreme Court for review,
which the Court granted.
Government-Enforced Rent
Control Is Not A Physical Taking
The Fifth Amendment's taking
clause generally requires just com-
pensation when the government
authorizes a physical occupation of
a person's property. The Yees con-
tended that the rent control ordi-
nance, in conjunction with Califor-
nia's Mobilehome Residency Law,
amounted to a physical occupation
of their property entitling them to
compensation under the takings
clause.
The Yees stated that as a result
of the two laws, park owners could
no longer set rents or decide who
would be their tenants. They fur-
ther argued that any reduction in
the rent for a mobile home caused
a corresponding increase in the
value because the mobile home
owner now owned, in addition to
the mobile home, the right to occu-
py it at a rent below the value set by
the free market. Furthermore, be-
cause the Mobilehome Residency
Law permitted the mobile home
owner to sell the mobile home in
place, he could receive a premium
from the purchaser equal to this
increase in value.
Thus, the Yees argued, the rent
control ordinance transferred a
discrete interest in land - the
right to occupy the land indefinite-
ly at a sub-market rent - from the
park owner to the mobile home
owner. The Yees argued that this
transfer amounted to a transfer of
the right of physical occupation of
their land and thus entitled them to
compensation.
The Supreme Court rejected the
Yees' argument that a physical
occupation had occurred. The
Court stated that the Escondido
ordinance, even when considered
in conjunction with the California
Mobilehome Residency Law, did
not authorize a compelled physical
invasion of property. Rather, the
Yees voluntarily rented their land
to mobile home owners.
Furthermore, neither the city
nor the state compelled the Yees to
continue to rent their property to
tenants. The court relied on the
fact that the Mobilehome Residen-
cy Law allowed a park owner who
wanted to change the use of his
land to evict his tenants, albeit
with six or twelve months notice.
In response to the Yees' contin-
ued emphasis on the transfer of
wealth from the park owners to the
mobile home owners, the Court
pointed out that other constitu-
tional forms of land use regulation
can also be said to transfer wealth
from the one who is regulated to
another. For example, zoning regu-
lations can transfer wealth from
those whose activities are prohibit-
ed to their neighbors. Thus, when a
property owner is prohibited from
mining coal on his land, the value
of his property may decline but the
value of his neighbor's property
may rise. The mobile home own-
er's ability to sell the mobile home
at a premium may make this
wealth transfer more visible than
in the ordinary case, but the trans-
128 Volume 4 Number 4/Fail, 1992
fer of wealth did not in itself
convert regulation into physical
invasion.
Because the Escondido rent con-
trol ordinance did not compel a
landowner to suffer the physical
occupation of his property, the
Court concluded that it did not
constitute a per se taking by the
government and compensation
was therefore not required.
Daniel Hynes
Second Circuit Finds That
New York Cable Downgrade
Fees Are Not Preempted By
Federal Cable Act
In Cable Television Association
of New York, Inc. v. William B.
Finneran, 954 F.2d 91 (2nd. Cir.
1992), the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit
held that a federal cable communi-
cation law does not preempt New
York regulations of cable televi-
sion downgrade charges. The court
found that Congress intended to
preempt only state rules that regu-
late rates for the provision of cable
services, and downgrade charges
were not this type of rate within the
meaning of the Cable Communica-
tions Policy Act of 1984 ("Cable
Act"), 47 U.S.C. 521 et seq. (1992).
Background
On December 3, 1990, in re-
sponse to customer complaints
about $40 to $100 charges, the
New York State Commission on
Cable Television ("the Commis-
sion") adopted regulations limiting
cable television companies' impo-
sition of downgrade charges. Since
consumers saved about $10 per
month by dropping to a lower level
of cable service, the high down-
grade fees tended to remove any
incentive to switch to a lower tier
of service. In addition, the cable
companies' cost to downgrade ser-
vice was either minimal, for newer
cable-ready television sets, or be-
tween $50 and $75, for older sets
requiring removal of a descrambler
box.
The Commission's regulations
define a downgrade charge as a fee
imposed on a subscriber for a
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change in service that results in a
less expensive tier of service. The
regulation did not prohibit down-
grade charges entirely but limited
the fee to the companies' actual
downgrading cost if: the customer
had been given adequate notice;
and the existing service had not
been maintained for the previous
six months.
Downgrade charges were also
permitted in order to prevent
churning. Churning occurs when a
customer signs up for a premium
channel in order to watch a partic-
ular program, and soon after elects
to downgrade to a cheaper service
tier.
On December 26, 1990, the Ca-
ble Television Association of New
York, Inc. ("Association") filed
suit in the District Court for the
Northern District of New York,
seeking a declaration that the Ca-
ble Act of 1984 preempted the
Commission's downgrade regula-
tions. The district court found that
the preemption provision of the
Cable Act did not apply to the
Commission's regulations. The As-
sociation appealed to the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit.
Cable Act Does Not Preempt State
Regulation
The Second Circuit began by
examining whether Congress in-
tended to preempt the entire field
of cable television regulation when
it passed the Cable Act of 1984.
After a comprehensive examina-
tion of the Cable Act's history, the
court of appeals noted that in
1984, the United States Supreme
Court gave the Federal Communi-
cation Commission ("FCC") dis-
cretion to preempt virtually any
state regulation of the cable indus-
try. As a result of the Supreme
Court's decision, Congress passed
the Cable Act and thereby ex-
pressed its intent to create a com-
prehensive scheme for regulating
cable television.
Despite this broad ability to
preempt, previous case law had
held that in the Cable Act, Con-
gress did not preempt state regula-
tion of downgrade charges. The
court of appeals reasoned that if
the FCC had meant to reverse this
prior decision, it could have done
so while issuing interpretations of
the Cable Act. The FCC's failure to
do so strongly indicated that no
such preemptive intent existed.
The Association argued that
Congress must have intended to
preempt state regulation of down-
grade charges since the Cable Act
effectively regulated other rates re-
lating to the provision of cable
services. Although the court of
appeals agreed that state regulation
of downgrade charges had some
effect on the rates cable companies
charged for general cable services,
the court stated that to preempt
every cost-imposing state regula-
tion would conflict with the Cable
Act's express authorization of state
regulation.
Lastly, the court of appeals ad-
dressed the Association's argument
that the regulations' impact on
cable provision rates was suffi-
ciently large to force the conclusion
that Congress must have intended
to preempt state regulation of
downgrade charges. The court of
appeals found no such congres-
sional intent for two reasons.
First, the Cable Act expressly
authorized state regulation in nu-
merous fields that affected cable
company service rates, and states
were allowed to regulate charges
associated with the complete dis-
connection of service.
Second, the language of the pre-
emption clause at issue failed to
evidence Congressional intent to
carve out a wide area free from
state regulation. The court held
that Congress meant to preempt
only state rules that regulated cable
rates relating to providing custom-
ers with service, not all cable charg-
es generally.
Downgrade Charges Are Not
Rates
The Association also argued that
downgrade charges fell under the
definition of rates and accordingly
were within the express preemp-
tion provisions of the Cable Act.
The Association contended that a
customer is provided with service
when, in fact, cable access is being
downgraded because cable service
includes service of machinery that
is necessary to facilitate program-
ming. The court of appeals dis-
agreed, finding that although cable
(continued on page 130)
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